The challenge
Corruption in local governments' use of federal funds was widespread and rarely exposed.
The case
In 2003 Brazil's federal comptroller began choosing municipalities by public lottery for detailed audits of how they spent federal transfers, and published the findings. Researchers compared mayors whose audits were released before an election with those audited after. Where corruption was revealed before the vote, mayors were significantly less likely to be re-elected, especially where local radio spread the news. Where audits reported two corruption violations before the vote, the policy reduced the incumbent's likelihood of re-election by seven percentage points, or 17%, versus the control group.
Why it worked
Random selection made audits credible and hard to manipulate. Publishing results gave voters information they used, but only where local media carried it.
Sources
- Ferraz, C., & Finan, F. (2008). Exposing corrupt politicians: The effects of Brazil's publicly released audits on electoral outcomes. Quarterly Journal of Economics.
- Ferraz, C., & Finan, F. (2008). Exposing corrupt politicians: The effects of Brazil's publicly released audits on electoral outcomes. Quarterly Journal of Economics.
Spot an error or know a better source? Tell us